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Abstract
Despite the lavish attention paid to the Ninth Amendment as supporting judicial
enforcement of unenumerated rights, surprisingly little attention has been paid to
the Amendment’s actual text. Doing so reveals a number of interpretive
conundrums. For example, although often cited in support of broad readings of
the Fourteenth Amendment, the text of the Ninth says nothing about how to
interpret enumerated rights such as those contained in the Fourteenth. No
matter how narrowly one construes the Fourteenth, the Ninth merely demands
that such enumerated rights not be construed to deny or disparage other rights
retained by the people. The standard use of the Ninth, in other words, has
nothing to do with the text of the Ninth Amendment. The standard theory of the
Ninth also places the text in considerable tension with that of the Tenth
Amendment. Although both the Ninth and Tenth Amendments close with the
same reference to “the people,” most contemporary scholars and courts treat the
same term in the two amendments as having opposite meanings, with the Ninth
referring to a single national people and Tenth referring to the people in the
several states. Finally, the text of the Ninth Amendment appears to be in
considerable tension with its historical application. Newly uncovered historical
evidence reveals that for more than one hundred years after its enactment, courts
applied the Ninth Amendment in a manner that preserved the autonomous rights
of the states. The text of the Ninth, however, speaks only of the retained rights of
the people, not the states.
This article addresses these and other textual mysteries of the Ninth Amendment.
The over-all effort is to construct a text-based theory of the Ninth that both
explains its historical application and reconciles the Amendment with other texts
in the Constitution, particularly the Tenth and Fourteenth Amendments.
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A Textual-Historical Theory of the Ninth Amendment
Kurt T. Lash
Once dismissed as an indecipherable inkblot, the Ninth Amendment1 has
experienced something of a renaissance. A number of recent articles and books
have enriched a previously moribund debate and significantly illuminated the
original understanding of the Clause.2 For example, we now know that the
Amendment played a critical role in the debate over the original Bill of Rights
and almost every major constitutional dispute of the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries.3 This should finally bury the oft-repeated canard that the
Ninth Amendment languished in obscurity from the time of its drafting.4
Secondly, despite earlier academic (and Supreme Court) pronouncements to the
contrary, there exists a rich corpus of federal and state court opinions referring to
Professor and W. Joseph Ford Fellow, Loyola Law School (Los Angeles). J.D. Yale
Law School (1992); B.A. Whitman College (1989). The author thanks Larry Solum for
his comments and helpful guidance in all matters involving legal theory.
1
“The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people.” Amendment IX, United States Constitution.
2
See Randy Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution: The Presumption of Liberty
(2004); Kurt T. Lash, The Lost Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 83 Tex. L.
Rev. 331 (2004); Kurt T. Lash, The Lost Jurisprudence of the Ninth Amendment, 83 Tex.
L. Rev. 597 (2005); Randy Barnett, The Ninth Amendment: It Means What it Says, 85
Tex. L. Rev. 1 (forthcoming 2007). At least one major constitutional law textbook has
reworked its discussion of the Ninth Amendment to take into consideration recent
historical evidence regarding the Ninth. See Processes of Constitutional Law Making:
Cases and Materials 152-53 (Paul Brest, Sanford Levinson, Jack M. Balkin, Akhil Reed
Amar, Reva B. Segal, eds.).
3
See Lash, The Lost Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, supra note 1 and Lash,
The Lost Jurisprudence of the Ninth Amendment, supra note 1 (together discussing the
role of the Ninth Amendment in delaying the ratification of the Bill of Rights, the first
Bank Bill, the creation of current state law doctrine, the Second Bank of the United
States, slavery, the constitutionality of the New Deal, and the scope of incorporation
doctrine).
4
See Bennett B. Patterson, The Forgotten Ninth Amendment 27 (1955) (“There has been
no direct judicial construction of the Ninth Amendment by the Supreme Court of the
United States of America. There are very few cases in the inferior courts in which any
attempt has been made to use the Ninth Amendment as the basis for the assertion of a
right.”); Randy E. Barnett, Introduction: James Madison’s Ninth Amendment, in 1 The
Rights Retained By the People: The History and Meaning of the Ninth Amendment vii
(Randy E. Barnett ed., 1989) (“For all but the last quarter of a century the amendment lay
dormant, rarely discussed and justifiably described as ‘forgotten’ in the one book devoted
to it.”); Calvin R. Massey, Silent Rights: The Ninth Amendment and the Constitution’s
Unenumerated Rights 9–10 (1995) (“Very little effort has been devoted to doctrinal
argument for the simple reason that a majority of the Supreme Court has never relied
upon the Ninth Amendment as the basis for any decision.”); Raoul Berger, The Ninth
Amendment, 66 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 1 (1980) (“Justice Goldberg rescued [the Ninth
Amendment] from obscurity in his concurring opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut.”);
Russell L. Caplan, The History and Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 69 Va. L. Rev.
223, 223–24 (1983) (“After lying dormant for over a century and a half, the ninth
amendment to the United States Constitution has emerged from obscurity to assume a
place of increasing, if bemused, attention. . . . Ninth Amendment analysis has proceeded
in three stages. In the first stage, which lasted until 1965, the amendment received only
perfunctory treatment from courts and commentators.”).
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the Ninth Amendment that stretches over the last two hundred years.5 Although
earlier research looked back no further than the time of the New Deal, we now
know that judicial citation to the Ninth Amendment ended at the time of the New
Deal.6 The relative obscurity of the Amendment at the end of the 20th century
thus is a recent phenomenon, and not a characteristic of the Clause from its
inception.
The historical application of the Ninth, however, seems to be unrelated to, or
even in tension with, the actual text of the Ninth Amendment. For more than one
hundred years after its adoption, courts and commentators understood and
applied the Ninth as a rule of construction preserving the autonomy of the states.
Almost invariably paired with the Tenth Amendment, the Ninth was pressed into
service in a wide variety of cases involving the need to limit federal power in
order to preserve the right to local self-government. States rights, of course, is an
issue traditionally associated with the Tenth Amendment—the only amendment
in the original Bill of Rights to expressly mention the states. The Ninth, on the
other hand, speaks of the retained rights of the People. The attempt to read the
Ninth as preserving states rights appears to follow the approach of the
Confederate Constitution which adopted a clause exactly like the Ninth—except
it altered the language to protect the retained rights of the people of the several
states.”7 Such a reading also appears to ignore the obvious textual difference
between the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, with the Tenth speaking of reserved
powers and the Ninth speaking of retained rights. Powers seems the proper term
when referring to prerogatives of governments (state or federal), whereas rights
seems intuitively to refer to the immunities of individuals (not states).
On the other hand, despite the fact that the text of the Ninth appears to lend itself
to the protection of individual rights, advocates of the individual rights theory of
the Ninth have yet to produce a textual theory of the Ninth capable of judicial
enforcement. Supreme Court references to the Ninth Amendment in early
privacy cases like Griswold v. Connecticut8 and Roe v. Wade,9 supported an
application of the Fourteenth Amendment, not the Ninth. Advocates of a
libertarian reading of the Ninth focus on the issue of non-enumerated rights—a
subject that only partially involves the Ninth Amendment—and have yet to
produce a comprehensive theory of the text itself.10 Opponents of the libertarian
reading of the Ninth, on the other hand, generally deny that the Clause has any
judicially enforceable meaning and claim that it merely echoes the general
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Lash, The Lost Jurisprudence, supra note 1.
Id. at 688.
7
See Constitution of the Confederate State of America art. VI, section 5 (1861).
8
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
9
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
10
For example, libertarian scholar Randy Barnett concedes that the Ninth Amendment
may well have protected local majoritarian (collective) rights in addition to individual
natural rights. See Barnett, The Ninth Amendment: It Means What it Says, supra note __
at 16 (“It is possible that the “other” rights retained by the people were both individual
and collective, in which case the collective rights model identifies a potential application
of the Ninth Amendment beyond the protection of individual liberties.”). See also id at
21, 79. Barnett’s theory of the Ninth Amendment, however, addresses only that aspect
implicating individual natural rights.
6
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federalist declaration of the Tenth Amendment.11 Thus, the contemporary debate
regarding the Ninth has proceeded without either side feeling obligated to
construct a judicially enforceable theory of the entire text.
In fact, taking the entire text of the Ninth Amendment seriously leads to some
surprising results. For example, the Ninth Amendment is often cited as indirect
support for a broad interpretation of liberty provisions such as the Due Process
Clause. One cannot reject a Due Process liberty claim, the argument goes, on the
grounds that no such liberty is listed in the Constitution. Doing so violates the
Ninth Amendment’s declaration that there are “other rights” retained by the
people.12 When one consults the full text of the Ninth Amendment, however, this
argument is revealed as a non-sequitor. The Ninth declares that, no matter the
interpreted scope of enumerated rights, there remains the possible existence of
other unenumerated rights. Thus, one can have as narrow a reading of Due
Process rights as one wishes without necessarily denying or disparaging the
existence of “other rights.” Thus, the most common contemporary use of the
Ninth cannot be viewed as a command of the text.13
When one attempts to read the Ninth’s text alongside of similar texts in the
Constitution—an approach Professor Akhil Amar refers to as intratextualism14-the mystery deepens. The Ninth closes with a reference to “the People.” This
same term closes the text of the Tenth Amendment. However, despite the fact
that these two amendments were placed side by side and ratified at the same
time, contemporary scholarship treats the exact same language in opposite ways.
Courts and commentators have long treated the closing phrase of the Tenth as a
reference to the people in the several states. Thus, all powers not delegated away
from or prohibited to the states are reserved to the control of the people in the
several states. Modern commentary on the Ninth Amendment, on the other hand,
generally views “the People” of the Ninth as an undifferentiated national body.15
But if the people hold reserved powers on a state by state basis, why do they not
hold retained rights in the same manner? Or, more bluntly, how likely is it that
11

See Russel Caplan, The History and Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 69 Va. L. Rev.
223 (1983); Thomas McAffee, The Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 90
Colum. L. Rev. 1215 (1990).
12
See, e.g., Griswold, 381 U.S. at 492 (Goldberg, J. concurring):
I do not mean to imply that the .... Ninth Amendment constitutes an
independent source of rights protected from infringement by either the
States or the Federal Government....While the Ninth Amendment - and
indeed the entire Bill of Rights - originally concerned restrictions upon
federal power, the subsequently enacted Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits the States as well from abridging fundamental personal
liberties.
See also, Barnett, The Ninth Amendment, supra note 1 at 14 (criticizing footnote four of
Carolene Products for limiting due process incorporation to textually enumerated rights).
13
As this article will make clear, although the primary semantic (literal) meaning of the
text is irrelevant to interpretations of other enumerated rights, the secondary or implied
meaning of the Ninth may guide interpretations of other rights. See infra note __ and
accompanying text.
14
See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 747 (1999).
15
See Barnett, The Ninth Amendment, supra note ___ at 79.
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the same term can have radically different meanings in side-by-side sentences
added to the Constitution at the same time?
This article addresses such textual and historical conundrums. Unlike other
contemporary accounts that tend to focus on the issue of unenumerated rights, I
will address the entire text of the Ninth Amendment, and consider what it means
to retain a right and how constructions of the Constitution might threaten to
“deny or disparage” the retained rights of the Ninth. Once we see the
Amendment in its entirety, it becomes apparent why courts and commentators
applied the Ninth Amendment in a manner preserving the right to local selfgovernment for more than one hundred years: This is the unavoidable operative
effect of the text as a whole.
I. The Parameters and Possibilities of the Text
The enumeration, in the constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed
to deny or disparage
others retained by the people.
This first section focuses on the text of the Ninth Amendment and attempts to
identify the textual parameters around which any account of the Ninth
Amendment must conform. When appropriate, I will consider the historical
record and attempt to identify which of the possible textual meanings are more or
less plausible, given historical evidence of original public understanding. In this
way, I hope to provide an account of the Ninth Amendment satisfactory in both
terms of originalism16 and textualism.17
All interpretive theories begin with the text. The words of the Constitution
determine the parameters of possible meaning. Although not self-defining, the
very idea of a written enforceable constitution presupposes a sufficient degree of
agreement regarding language and grammar as to allow judicial enforcement
over time.18 From the perspective of popular sovereignty, the text is how the
People speak from one generation to the next. Some scholars suggest that
16

Most originalists today seek not the original intentions of the framers, but the original
public meaning of the text. As described by Lawrence Solum: An originalist judge
“should make a good faith effort to determine the original meaning, where original
meaning is understood to be the meaning that (i) the framers would have reasonably
expected (ii) the audience to whom the Constitution is addressed (ratifiers, contemporary
interpreters) (iii) to attribute to the framers, (iv) based on the evidence (public record)
that was publicly available. “ See Solum, Constitutional Stare Decisis, supra note __, at
30.
17
For a helpful example of an interlocking use of originalism and textualism, see Akhil
Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 747 (1999). Amar’s particular approach
stresses the need to harmonize similar terms and phrases used in related passages in the
Constitution. I fallow the same approach in this article. See infra note __ and
accompanying text.
18
See Whittington, supra note __ at 50-61.
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interpreting a written text by its very nature requires a form of originalist
analysis.19 Whether this is true, analysis of the text sets the ground rules for any
viable theory of constitutional meaning.
As the article proceeds, I will distinguish primary textual (or semantic) meanings
of the Ninth from secondary implied meanings arising from the text.20 For
example, as far as the primary meaning of the Ninth is concerned, the
amendment comes into play only when the existence of certain enumerated rights
is construed in a manner that denies or disparages other unenumerated retained
rights. The text does not declare that unenumerated rights actually exist or that
they be affirmatively protected, only that they not be denied or disparaged due to
the existence of certain enumerated rights. On the other hand, the text does seem
to imply that other retained rights exist and ought to be respected to the same
degree as enumerated rights. This implied meaning is a secondary meaning
arising from the text, but not actually required by the text. As we shall see, the
content and scope of implied secondary meanings is dependent on what we
identify as the primary meaning of the text.
We begin, however, at the beginning: The opening lines of the Ninth
Amendment.
1.

The enumeration of certain rights in the constitution . . .

According to contemporary dictionaries, the meaning of “enumeration” was no
different than that commonly understood today: to enumerate meant “to number”
and an enumeration was simply “a numbering or count.”21 The opening phrase,
“the enumeration of certain rights in the constitution” thus seems clear enough.
The “certain rights” enumerated in the Constitution at the very least includes the
rights “numbered” or listed in the first eight amendments to the Constitution. It
also seems likely the reference includes the rights numbered in Article I, section
9 (e.g. habeas corpus, ex post facto laws, etc). To the extent that additional
support is necessary, this reading is supported by the history surrounding the
adoption of the Ninth. Federalists like James Madison initially resisted adding a
Bill of Rights on the grounds that enumerating (or listing) certain rights might be
read to imply all non-enumerated (non-listed) rights were assigned into the hands
19

See Id.
I wish to thank Larry Solum for first raising with me the important distinction between
semantic textual meaning and implied textual meaning. For a brief explanation of
implied meanings or “implicature,” see Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
“Implicature” at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/implicature.
21
See, e.g., The Royal Standard English Dictionary 224 (1788) (Early American
Imprints, 1st series, no. 21385 (filmed); Entick's New Spelling Dictionary 150 (1800)
(same) (Early American Imprints, 1st series, no. 37375 (filmed). In correspondence,
Larry Solum has raised the possibility of an amendment calling for the enforcement of all
“unenumerated rights.” Such a clause, by definition, would not fall under the Phrase “the
enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights.” The “unenumerated rights”
amendment would neither “number” rights nor would such rights be “certain” or specific
enough to be included in the text of the Ninth Amendment.
20

.
.
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of the government.22 Anti-federalists responded that such a list of enumerated
rights already existed in Article I, section 9—thus making the need for some kind
of explanatory amendment even more necessary.23 In his speech to the House of
Representatives, Madison explained that the Ninth Amendment was meant in
part to address such concerns about the implied relinquishment of rights due to
the enumeration of other rights in the Constitution.24 The general language of the
Ninth tracks this concern by prohibiting erroneous implications arising from the
enumeration of any right in the Constitution, including those added after the
adoption of the Ninth itself.25
But what of those rights enumerated in the original Constitution such as those
listed in Article I, section 10? These rights constrain the states and include the
Impairment of Contracts Clause as well as immunity from ex post facto laws and
bills of attainder. Because these rights are among those rights “enumerate[ed] . .
. in the constitution,” they fall within the literal meaning of the Ninth
Amendment. If these rights are part of the “enumeration of certain rights,” then
one way to read the full text of the Ninth would be as follows: “The enumeration
of certain rights (including those enumerated against the states in Section 10)
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained (against the states) by
the people.” Although textually possible, historically such a reading it is highly
implausible. First, we know that Madison’s attempt to add an amendment
expressly binding the states failed.26 It seems unlikely that an express restraint
on state action would fail but a text of unlimited restraint in the form of
unenumerated rights against the states would receive super-majoritarian support.
As Chief Justice John Marshall concluded in Barron v. Baltimore,27 the overall
structure of the Constitution suggests that general language binds only the federal
government, not the states.28 When one adds the fact that no one in the history of
the Constitution has ever suggested such a reading of the Ninth, the odds that
“the enumeration of certain rights” the Ninth refers to unenumerated rights
against the states becomes vanishingly small. Put another way, conventional
wisdom is correct in at least this regard: The Ninth does not involve rights
enforceable against the states.
There is, however, a way to read “the enumeration of certain rights” in a manner
that includes the rights listed against the states in Article I, section 10 without
embracing the historically implausible interpretation described above. For
example, one could read the text as follows: “The enumeration of certain rights
(including those enumerated against the states in Section 10) shall not be
22

See James Madison, Speech Before the House of Representatives (June 8, 1789), in
James Madison, Writings, supra note __ at 448-49.
23
See Leonard W. Levy, Origins of the Bill of Rights 28–30 (1999) (discussing how the
anti-Federalists used the inclusion of restrictions on federal power in the Constitution to
argue for a bill of rights).
24
See James Madison, Speech Before the House of Representatives (June 8, 1789), in
James Madison, Writings, supra note __ at 448-49.
25
Subsequent amendments might change the scope of the Ninth, but nothing in the
original text or history precludes application of the Ninth’s rule of construction to
implications arising from the adoption of later amendments.
26
See Amar, The Bill of Rights, supra note __ at 22.
27
32 U.S. 243 (1833).
28
Id.
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construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people (in the several
states).” According to this reading, the fact that some rights are enumerated
against the states shall not be construed to disparage or deny other rights left
under local (state) control. As we shall see, this reading tracks how courts and
commentators read the Ninth in the early years following its adoption and for
decades afterwards. For now, it is enough to conclude that the reference to
certain enumerated rights can include all rights enumerated in the Constitution,
whether against the states or federal government, without doing violence to either
the text or the history surrounding its adoption.
2.

. . . shall not be construed . . .

This phrase forms the core of the Ninth Amendment; it is the hub around which
the rest of the text turns. As a matter of semantic meaning, all the Ninth
demands is that the enumeration of rights not be construed in a particular way.
The Ninth Amendment was the first provision added to the Constitution that
solely addressed the issue of interpretation.29 All constitutional provisions, of
course, can be understood as rules of interpretation to some degree. For example,
the Necessary and Proper Clause can be understood both as a concession of
power (literally, for the section reads “Congress shall have power . . . to make all
laws necessary and proper . . .”), and as a rule of construction (this clause is
properly interpreted to allow only those laws which are in fact “necessary and
proper”). Similarly, the Free Speech Clause can be understood both as a right,
and as a rule of construction forbidding any interpretation of congressional power
which “abridges freedom of speech.” The Ninth Amendment, however, is
neither a grant of power nor a source of rights.30 All that the Ninth Amendment
does is forbid interpreting particular provisions in a particular way. This is what
makes the Ninth Amendment unique: It sole textual function is to control the
interpretation of other provisions.31
29

The second was the Eleventh Amendment.
See Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 776 n.14 (2d ed. 1988) (“It is a
common error, but an error nonetheless, to talk of ‘ninth amendment rights.’ The ninth
amendment is not a source of rights as such; it is simply a rule about how to read the
Constitution.”) (emphasis in original).
31
This single focus on constitutional interpretation might seem anomalous to us today,
but at the time, methods of interpretation were of critical concern. Today, interpretive
methodology is generally treated as a side (and seemingly irresolvable) issue in
constitutional law. At the time of the Founding, however, treatises on the Constitution
focused much of their primary analysis on proper interpretive method. Early
constitutional treatises spent a great deal of time exploring the basic principles of
constitutional interpretation. See St. George Tucker, A View of the Constitution; Joseph
Story, Commentaries on the Constitution; others. The debates over the proposed Bill of
Rights ultimately focused on the Ninth’s rule of construction, and two years after the Bill
was ratified another amendment was added to the constitution that also declared a rule of
constitutional interpretation. According to the Eleventh Amendment: “The judicial power
of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another state, or
by citizens or subjects of any foreign state.” (emphasis added). In fact, the issue of proper
constitutional interpretation loomed far greater in the minds of the Founders than any
particular enumerated power or right. The Federalists believed that proper interpretation
30
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As do a number of provisions in the Bill of Rights, the Ninth Amendment uses
passive language (“shall not be construed”), leaving it unclear who “shall not
construe” the Constitution in the forbidden manner. We might be tempted to
conclude that according to John Marshall’s reasoning in Barron v. Baltimore the
Ninth’s rule of construction applies only against the federal government. But this
is required neither by the text of the Ninth nor Marshall’s decision in Barron.
According to Marshall, had the framers intended the Bill of Rights to serve as
“limitations on the powers of the State governments, they would have imitated
the framers of the original Constitution, and have expressed that intention.”32
The rule of the Ninth Amendment, however, does not limit the powers of the
state governments (quite the opposite as we shall see). Like the rest of the Bill of
Rights, the Ninth’s rule of construction serves to limit the powers of the federal
government. State officials would be as bound to follow this rule as would any
federal official. For example, suppose that a state judge is faced with a claimed
federal constitutional right nowhere enumerated in the Constitution. The Ninth
Amendment would prevent the state judge from concluding that because the right
was not enumerated in the federal constitution therefore it was not retained by
the people. In fact, all officials, whether state or federal, are bound by their oaths
to support the Constitution and this includes respecting the rule of construction
announced by the Ninth Amendment.
3.

The enumeration of certain rights . . . shall not be construed to deny or
disparage other rights.

It is generally accepted that one of the central purposes of the Ninth
Amendment33 was to avoid the implication that the Bill of Rights was an
exhaustive list of rights.34 Just because a right was not specifically enumerated
did not mean the right did not exist. Put another way, the fact that some rights
are enumerated must not be construed to suggest rights must be enumerated: the
fact of enumeration shall not imply the necessity of enumeration.
But the text addresses more than the erroneous denial of rights. It also forbids
construing the fact of enumeration in a manner that disparages other rights. As
distinguished from outright denial, disparagement suggests a lessening or
diminishment of retained rights, as opposed to outright denial of such rights.35
of enumerated powers obviated the need for a list of particular rights. Those who
criticized the lack of a Bill of Rights did not so much disagree as fear proper
interpretation would be ignored without a list of rights declaring the proper interpreted
scope of federal power—added “for greater caution.” See Preamble to the Proposed Bill
of Rights.
32
Barron, 32 U.S. 243, 250 (1833).
33
The historical evidence suggests that the Ninth Amendment had dual purposes: (1)
preventing the disparagement of unenumerated rights and (2) limiting the construction of
federal power. See The Inescapable Federalism of the Ninth Amendment (forthcoming);
See also Lash, The Lost Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 331
(2004).
34
See James Madison, Speech Introducing the Bill of Rights to the House of
Representatives.
35
According to a contemporary dictionary by Samuel Johnson, to disparage meant “to
treat with contempt; to lessen; to disgrace in marriage.” See Samuel Johnson, A School

9

The “Disparagement Clause” thus prevents unwarranted diminishment of
retained rights because of their lack of enumeration. Theoretically, such
disparagement might occur in different ways. For example, the fact of
enumeration might be read to suggest a hierarchy of rights, with enumerated
rights occupying a higher status than non-enumerated rights. The Disparagement
Clause prevents this by declaring that the fact of enumeration shall not imply the
superiority of enumeration. Additionally, disparagement might refer to treating
non-enumerated rights as having a narrower scope than enumerated rights. To
prevent this, the Ninth declares that the fact of enumeration shall not be
construed to imply the lessor scope of non-enumerated rights.
These two views of disparagement (lower hierarchy and limited scope) are but
different ways of expressing the same idea. For example, courts strongly
disfavor content-based laws that restrict the enumerated freedom of speech in a
public forum.36 In such situations, courts apply what is called “strict scrutiny”
and demand that the government show that its law is the least restrictive means of
accomplishing a compelling interest. Suppose, however, that a federal court
refused to provide the same level of scrutiny for a non-enumerated right on the
grounds that only enumerated rights should receive strict scrutiny. For the
purpose of our analysis, it does not matter what degree of scrutiny is actually
provided, only that the level of scrutiny is less for unenumerated rights. The
simple fact that scrutiny is lower due to the fact of non-enumeration is enough to
render this interpretation in violation of the Ninth Amendment. It lessens the
“strength” of the retained right and renders it less immune to government
regulation. Put another way, this approach disparages the unenumerated right.
Dictionary 53 (1797) (Early American Imprints, 1st series, no. 30640).
Other
contemporary dictionaries contained similar definitions, generally defining the term as
cheapening or lessening in comparison with something else. See “Thomas Sheridan, A
complete dictionary of the English language, both with regard to sound and meaning: one
main object of which is, to establish a plain and permanent standard of pronunciation. To
which is prefixed a rhetorical grammar.” (1789)( Early American Imprints, 1st series, no.
45588) (to “injure by union with something inferior in excellence.”); See William Perry,
The Royal Standard English Dictionary (Edinburgh, 1794)(“to treat with contempt; to
lessen.”). Usage in newspapers and sermons generally used the term as meaning “to
insult.” See, e.g., A sermon, on the duty of attending the public worship of God.
Preached at Digby in Nova-Scotia, April 19th, 1789. By Roger Viets, Rector of
Digby)(“tis as easy to commend our neighbor as to disparage him”); Pennsylvania
Evening Herald, published as The Pennsylvania Herald, and General Advertiser; Date:
01-30-1788 (“those fables aimed not to disparage an early but a hasty marriage”); Boston
Gazette, published as The Boston Gazette, and the Country Journal; Date: 05-05-1788
(“ill men never gain credit but disparage themselves” [through their use of oaths and
insults]); Massachusetts Spy, published as The Worcester Magazine; Date: 07-17-1788;
Volume: XVII; Issue: 798; Page: [1] (least of all does it become [a man] to disparage [a
woman]); Loans. Communicated to the House of Representatives, February 13, 1793 (2d
Cong. 2d Sess.) (“It has been alleged, to disparage the management under the present . .
.”); Public credit. Communicated to the Senate, January 16 and 21, 1795. (3rd Cong, 2d
Sess.)(“it is in vain to disparage credit, by objecting to its abuses”). All of these uses
(insult, lessen, cheapen by inferior comparison) carry the connotation of diminishment.
36
See, e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU (II), 124 S. Ct. 2783 (2004) (applying strict scrutiny to
laws regulating speech on the internet on the basis of adult content); Capital Square v.
Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995) (applying strict scrutiny to protect freedom of speech
against a government claimed need to avoid violating the establishment clause).
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In a similar manner, the Disparagement Clause prevents treating enumerated
rights as superior to non-enumerated rights. For example, suppose the people of
a given state pass a law providing a means by which marriage contracts may be
dissolved (such as no-fault divorce). The law is challenged on the grounds that it
violates Article I, section 10, which prohibits any state law impairing the
obligation of contracts. In such a case, if a court holds that the impairment of
contract clause trumps the people’s collective right to regulate marriage because
one is enumerated and the other is not, then this construction violates the Ninth
Amendment. It construes the fact of enumeration in a manner that disparages
non-enumeration.37 This does not control the outcome of the case, it merely
prohibits one particular interpretive approach to resolving the issue.
4.

The Ninth and Enumerated Rights

A common argument regarding the Ninth Amendment is that it supports, in some
way, a particular (and generally broad) interpretation of enumerated rights such
as the Due Process or Privileges or Immunities Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment. In terms of the text, however, the Ninth has nothing to say about
how enumerated rights ought to be construed beyond forbidding a construction
that denies or disparages non-enumerated rights.
Consider the following argument:
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
incorporates only those rights enumerated in the first eight
amendments.
Some judges and scholars argue that this limited reading of the Fourteenth
Amendment violates the Ninth Amendment by “denying or disparaging” other
non-enumerated rights.38 In fact, the above argument does not affect non37

The example in the text is drawn from discussion by Chief Justice John Marshall in
Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 627-28 (1819).
38
Randy Barnett, for example, criticizes Footnote Four of Carolene Products for limiting
the content of Substantive Due Process Clause to just those incorporated rights that are
listed in the text of the Constitution. See, Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution, supra
note __ at 254 (“the pure footnote four approach is undercut by the original meaning of
the both the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments”); id. (“also inconsistent with the Ninth
Amendment is the third and current Footnote Four-Plus approach that elevates some
unenumerated rights to the exalted status of “fundamental” while disparaging the other
liberties of the people as mere “liberty interests.”). Casey L. Westover, Structural
Interpretation and the New Federalism: Finding the Proper Balance Between State
Sovereignty and Federal Supremacy, 88 Marq. L. rev. 693 (2005) (“Of course, there is no
"right to privacy" provision in the Bill of Rights or elsewhere in the Constitution, but, as
Justice Douglas rightly pointed out, that cannot end the analysis--"[t]he Ninth
Amendment provides: 'The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."' ); See also Griswold v.
Connecticut (Goldberg J., concurring) (suggesting that the Ninth supports reading
unenumerated rights into the Due Process Clause); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152
(1973) (citing the Ninth Amendment in support of a woman's unenumerated due process
right to obtain an abortion); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848 (1992)
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enumerated rights in any manner. A limited reading of the enumerated right to
due process says nothing about whether other rights are retained beyond those
encompassed by the enumerated right. It neither denies their existence nor
disparages their scope. For example, during the Nineteenth century, courts often
considered whether a claimed right fell within an enumerated right in the federal
or state constitutions. Even if the court read the enumerated federal rights
narrowly, there remained the additional question of whether the claimed right
was nevertheless a non-enumerated natural right retained by the people of a given
state as a matter of state law. Calder v. Bull and Fletcher v. Peck are both
examples of this methodology.39
In terms of the literal semantic meaning of the text, then, a narrow construction
of an enumerated right does not deny or disparage non-enumerated rights.
Accordingly, reading the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
incorporate nothing but particular rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights does not
violate the rule of construction declared by the Ninth Amendment.40 Whatever
non-enumerated rights may be, by definition they exist outside the parameters of
enumerated rights.41
On the other hand, consider the following argument:
The fact that a claimed right is listed nowhere in the
Constitution, including the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment, means that there is no such retained right.
Unlike a limited reading of an enumerated right, this argument goes further and
relies on the fact of enumeration to deny the existence of other rights retained by
the people. This violates the Ninth Amendment’s rule of construction. In this
situation, it is not the limited construction of enumerated rights that denies or
disparages other non-enumerated rights. Instead, it is the court’s refusal to
recognize rights beyond those enumerated which denies or disparages those
rights. Again, it matters nothing to the Ninth Amendment how broadly or
narrowly enumerated rights are read, only that they not be construed to deny or
disparage other rights retained by the people.
The above must be distinguished from reliance on the Ninth Amendment as
indirect or circumstantial support for a particular reading of a separate
amendment. Depending on one’s view of the Ninth, it could be used in general
support of a broad (or narrow) reading of provisions such as the Due Process or
Privileges or Immunities Clauses. But these secondary or implied meanings of

(citing the Ninth Amendment in support of a right to procure an abortion under the
Fourteenth Amendment).
39
See Lash, The Lost Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, supra note __ at 40109 (discussing the state-law approach to natural rights in Calder and Fletcher).
40
But see Barnett, The Ninth Amendment, supra note __ at 14, 77 (arguing that Carolene
Products footnote four violates the interpretive principle of the Ninth).
41
As I discuss later, there may be an implied meaning of the Ninth that affects the scope
of enumerated rights, but such an implied secondary meaning depends on the primary
semantic meaning.
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the Ninth are contingent upon the primary meaning of the Ninth Amendment.42
For example, if the Ninth protects unenumerated individual natural rights (and
only individual natural rights), then this might lend circumstantial support to a
similar reading of the Fourteenth Amendment. On the other hand, the Ninth may
have been intended to preserve the retained rights of the people to local selfgovernment. If so, this counsels against reading the Ninth in support of broad
readings of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause that unduly
interfere with local autonomy.43
Summary: The Ninth Amendment prevents interpretations of enumerated rights
that negatively affect unenumerated retained rights. Neither unduly narrow nor
excessively broad interpretations of enumerated rights violate the Ninth
Amendment as long as the fact of enumeration is not relied upon to suggest the
necessity or superiority of enumeration. It is possible to use the Ninth as implied
or indirect support for general theories of broad—or narrow—constructions of
enumerated rights, but these secondary theories depend on the primary meaning
of the Ninth Amendment (and this, in turn, depends on one theory of
constitutional interpretation).
5.

The “Other Rights” Retained by the People

Much of the discussion surrounding the Ninth involves the nature of the “other
rights” retained by the people. The meaning of the term is not self-evident, if
only due to the fact that the concept of rights has undergone conceptual
development since the Founding.44 But even if one limits the investigation to the
Founding period, common usage of the term rights included 1) alienable and
unalienable natural rights,45 2) positive rights,46 3) individual rights,47 4)
collective revolutionary rights,48 5) majoritarian democratic rights, and 5) the
retained rights of the sovereign states49 (and this is an incomplete list). Any or all
42

Randy Barnett, for example, links the Ninth to concerns about individual natural rights,
and relies on this reading to support a similar reading of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause. This is implicit in his argument that the incorporation doctrine of Carolene
Products’ footnote four (which involves an interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause) violates the principles of the Ninth Amendment. See id.
43
See infra note __ and accompanying text.
44
See, e.g., W. N. Hoefeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions (1919) (articulating a
typology of rights which remains influential in legal and political theory).
45
See The Declaration of Independence (1776) (referring to the unalienable rights of life
liberty and the pursuit of happiness); See also John Locke, (Second) Treatise on
Government (1690).
46
See James Madison, Speech to the House of Representatives (June 8, 1789) (speaking
of the positive rights secured under the proposed Bill of Rights such as trial by jury).
47
1 Annals of Cong. 759-60 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. Sedgwick, Aug.
15, 1789) (discussing the unenumerated individual right of a man to “wear his hat if he
pleased” or “go to bed when he thought proper.”).
48
See James Madison, Speech to the House of Representatives, in Writings, supra note
__ at 441 (proposing an amendment declaring “that the people have the indubitable,
unalienable, and indefeasible right to reform or change their government”).
49
See Article II, Articles of Confederation (“[e]ach state retains its sovereignty, freedom,
and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this
Confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled.”).
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of these may have been understood as comprising the retained rights of the
people.
The innovation of a federal system of government adds yet another wrinkle to
our understanding of retained rights circa 1791. Under the Articles of
Confederation, “each state retain[ed] its sovereignty, freedom and independence,
and every power jurisdiction and right [not] expressly delegated to the United
States.”50 It then remained up to the people of each state whether to delegate
those retained powers and rights to their state government, or retain them to the
people of the state under their individual state constitution. This is how the New
York Convention phrased the retained rights of the people in that state:
The powers of government may be reassumed by the people,
whenever it shall become necessary to their happiness; that every
power jurisdiction and right, which is not by the said constitution
clearly delegated to the congress of the United States, or the
departments of the government thereof, remains to the people of
the several states, or to their respective state governments, to
whom they may have granted the same.51
In other words, from the time of the Articles onward, the people had a variety of
choices when it came to “retained rights.” They could 1) retain rights from the
federal government but leave them to state control, 2) retain rights from state
governments but delegate them to federal control, or 3) retain them from both
state and federal control. All of these scenarios involve rights retained by the
people in one form or another. We are left then with a variety of rights that could
be retained in a variety of ways.
Although scholars often associate the “other (retained) rights” of the Ninth with
individual natural rights,52 the text itself carries no such limitation. In fact, there
is strong historical support for the proposition that the retained rights of the
people were considered so vast as to not be capable of enumeration.53 Certainly
no Founder (including James Madison) limited the protections of the Ninth to a
particular kind of right.54 As a matter of both text and history, the “other rights
50

See Art. II, Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union (1777).
See Declaration of the New York Convention (July 26, 1788), in 1 The Rights
Retained by the People: The History and Meaning of the Ninth Amendment 356 (Randy
Barnett, ed.,1989).
52
See generally, Barnett, The Ninth Amendment, supra note __; Calvin Massey, Silent
Rights: The Ninth Amendment and the Constitution’s Unenumerated Rights (1995);
Suzanna Sherry, The Ninth Amendment: Righting an Unwritten Constitution, 64 ChiKent L. Rev. 1001 (1988).
53
See, for example, James Wilson, Remarks in the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention
(Nov. 28, 1787), in 2 The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution
388 (Stevens Point, Wis.; Worzilla Publishing, 1976) (“In all societies there are many
powers and rights, which cannot be particularly enumerated. “).
54
Professor Caplan argues that retained rights are those protected under the state
constitutions. See Russell Caplan, The History and Meaning of the Ninth Amendment,
69 Va. L. Rev. 223 (1983). The historical evidence, however, suggests a much broader
conception of retained rights. See infra note __ and accompanying text. Again, however,
at this point I wish only to point out that the text does not include Caplan’s limitation.
51
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retained by the people” remains an unrestricted term. It can be read quite
broadly, potentially including everything from freedom of speech to the right to
sleep one one’s left side to the right of local majorities to decide public education
policy. In other words, the “other rights” of the Ninth potentially include all
rights capable of being retained by the people, whether natural, positive,
individual, majoritarian or even governmental.55
This is a critical point about the text of the Ninth Amendment. Much scholarly
work has gone into establishing that retained rights at the time of the Founding
included individual natural rights.56 I think such work is persuasive. However, a
great deal turns on whether individual rights were the only rights retained under
the Ninth Amendment and whether all retained rights (individual and otherwise)
were left to the control of state majorities. The remaining text of the Ninth
Amendment itself provides some clues, as do closely related texts in the rest of
the Bill of Rights.57
6.

“Others retained by the people”

A retained right is a right withheld from government control.58 The opposite of a
retained right is an assigned right—one delegated to government control. This is
how Madison explained the distinction in his speech introducing his proposed
Ninth Amendment to the House of Representatives:
It has been objected also against a bill of rights, that, by
enumerating particular exceptions to the grant of power, it would
disparage those rights which were not placed in that
enumeration, and it might follow by implication, that those
rights which were not singled out, were intended to be assigned
into the hands of the general government, and were consequently
insecure.59
According to Madison, the concern about adding a Bill of Rights was that all
unenumerated rights would be “assigned” into the hands of the general
government. It was to avoid this erroneous delegation of power that Madison
proposed the Ninth Amendment. Thus, preventing erroneous denial or
disparagement of retained rights, by definition, means preventing erroneous
enlargement of government power over that particular subject.
55

See Emmerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, or, Principles of the Law of Nature:
Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns, 53, 54 (1758)
(Northampton, Mass. ed. , 1805) (describing the natural rights of nations).
56
See Barnett, The Restoring the Lost Constitution, supra note __; Massey, Silent Rights,
supra note __.
57
This is what Akhil Amar refers to as Intratextualism. See Akhil Reed Amar,
Intratextualism, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 747 (1999).
58
According to contemporary dictionaries, “to retain” meant “to hold in custody,” see
The Royal Standard English Dictionary 438 (1788) (Early American Imprints, 1st series,
no. 21385), or simply “to keep.” See A General Dictionary of the English Language
(1789) (image 629 of 822) (Early American Imprints, 1st series, no. 49966).
59. James Madison, Speech in Congress Proposing Constitutional Amendments (June 8,
1789), in James Madison, Writings, supra note__, at 448–49.
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The Dual Nature of Retained Rights
We know that, in theory, rights may be retained against either federal or state
governments (or both). For example, although the First Amendment prohibited
the federal government from establishing religion, the people retained the right to
establish religion on a state level subject only to the constraints of state law.
Thus, the people of the state of Massachusetts retained from the federal
government the right to tax people for the support of churches and clergy but
nevertheless assigned that right into the hands of their state government (and
continued to do so until 1833).60 Prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the right to regulate religion at a local level remained a majoritarian
right retained by the people of each state.
Under the federal Constitution, retained rights thus had a dual nature. They
could be both retained and delegated at the same time, depending on the
institution of government at issue (federal or state). This dual nature of retained
right was highlighted in one of our earliest constitutional controversies. When
the Adam’s Administration passed the Alien and Sedition Acts, Madison joined
others in criticizing the Acts as violating the First and Tenth Amendments.61
Madison argued that, because the First Amendment denied the federal
government control over the retained right to freedom of speech, this meant that
under the Tenth Amendment control over seditious libel remained under the
control of the people in the several states.62 In this way, the Sedition Act violated
the individual right to free speech and the people’s collective right to regulate
speech on a state level.63
Libertarian theories of the Ninth Amendment miss this critical dual nature of
retained rights. To begin with, there is no reason to limit retained rights to
individual rights (as libertarian scholars like Randy Barnett concede64). But most
important, although retained rights may be individual or collective, the Ninth
always guards the people’s collective right to control the particular matter on a
state level. For example, suppose one of the retained rights of the people is the
right of self-defense. Should the federal government attempt to deny or disparage
60

See, e.g., John Witte, Jr., "A Most Mild and Equitable Establishment of Religion":
John Adams and the Massachusetts Experiment, 41 J. Church & St. 213 (1999).
61
See Madison, Report on the Alien and Sedition Acts [sic], in Writings, supra note __ at
608. Although given the aforementioned title by the editor, Madison’s Report actually
was a report on the controversial Virginia Resolutions of 1798. See id. at 608 (“The
committee have deemed it a more useful task to revise with a critical eye the resolutions
which have met with this disapprobation”). For a discussion of the Report and its
relevance to debates over the Ninth Amendment, see Lash, The Inescapable Federalism
of the Ninth Amendment (A Reply to Randy Barnett) (2007 forthcoming).
62
See Madison, Report on the Alien and Sedition Acts, supra note __ at 610 (discussing
the varying meanings of the term “ “states”) and id. at 610-11 (explaining and defending
the claim in the Virginia Resolutions of 1798 that the Alien and Sedition Acts violated
the rights of the states).
63
The Sedition Act involved an enumerated right (freedom of speech), but retained
unenumerated rights would work in the same way. Rights retained from the federal
control would be left to the control of the people in the several states.
64
See Barnett, the Ninth Amendment, supra note __ at 16 (conceding the possibility that
the Ninth protected collective rights).
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this right because it is not specifically enumerated, this would violate the Ninth
Amendment. As a retained individual right, it would be left to the people of each
state to determine how and when the right to self-defense would (or would not)
be regulated. Although one might argue that the principles of natural law
preclude denying the right even on a state level, this would be a matter for state
courts to decide and, ultimately, the people of each individual state.65
Suppose, on the other hand, that the federal government in 1792 decided that the
right to self-defense was a natural right and that states were not adequately
protecting this fundamental right. Accordingly, Congress passes the “Federal
Self Defense Act” requiring states to protect to the individual right of selfdefense. Unless the law is a necessary and proper means for advancing an
enumerated federal responsibility, the Act would violate the reserved powers of
the states as guaranteed by the Tenth Amendment. All powers not delegated (or
prohibited) are reserved to the states. This is true even if one accepts the
proposition that the personal right to self-defense is a retained natural right of the
people. In this way, a retained right might be individual in nature but collective
in terms of the combined effect of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments. Although
later constitutional amendments (such as the Fourteenth) may limit the category
of rights left to state majoritarian control, this does not change the operative
effect (much less original purpose) of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments.
Once we recognize how the Ninth and Tenth Amendment work in tandem to
keep certain matters under local control, it becomes clear that “the people” of the
Ninth are no different than “the people” of the Tenth. The Tenth declares that all
powers not delegated to the federal government or prohibited to the states are
reserved to the states or to the people. It has never been seriously disputed that
this is a reference to the people’s right (whether viewed as a national people or as
the people in the several states) to reserve certain powers to the control of local
majorities who may at their discretion assign them into the hands of their state
governments. Following what Akhil Amar refers to as intratextualism,66 it seems
logical that the same term in an adjoining provision adopted by the same people
at the same time would have the same meaning.

65

This is precisely how the Supreme Court approaches claims of natural rights in cases
like Calder v. Bull. See Lash, The Lost Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment,
supra note __ at 403. See also, Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, supra note __ at
55 (“A nation then has a right to perform what actions it thinks fit, both when they do not
concern the proper and perfects rights of any other [nation], and when it is bound to it
only by an internal without any perfect external obligation. If it makes an ill use of its
liberty, it offends; but others ought to suffer it to do so, having no right to command it to
do otherwise. . . . It is therefore necessary, on many occasions, that nations should suffer
certain things to be done, that are very unjust and blamable in their own nature, because
they cannot oppose it by open force, without violating the liberty of some particular state,
and destroying the foundation of natural society.”). The work of Vattel was well known
at the time of the Founding and was frequently cited by early constitutional theorists like
St. George Tucker. See, e.g., Tucker, Blackstone’s Commentaries, Appendix Note D, A
View of the Constitution at 151 (linking the work of Vattel with the principles of the
Ninth and Tenth Amendments).
66
See Amar, Intratextualism, supra note __.
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We can confirm that the term “the people” meant the same thing in both the
Ninth and Tenth Amendments by reference to a generous historical record. But
before doing so, once again there is additional support for such a reading in the
texts of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments. We know that retained rights, by
definition, are rights not delegated to the control of the federal government. This
seems clear enough from the term “retained” and it was expressly declared by the
drafter of the Ninth, James Madison. Retained rights therefore are powers not
delegated to the national government. Under the text of the Tenth Amendment,
all non-delegated powers are reserved to the states unless otherwise prohibited to
the same by the Constitution. The only issue then is whether the retained rights
of the Ninth involve matters “prohibited” to the states. This cannot be so, of
course, for this would mean that all unenumerated rights are automatically
withheld from both the state and federal governments. As explained above, there
is no plausible historical argument that this was the understood meaning of the
Ninth Amendment. It would result in the absurd scenario where the expressly
enumerated retained rights of speech and non-establishment would be left to
local majoritarian control, but all unenumerated retained rights would be
automatically removed from state control.67
Reading the Ninth Amendment in light of the textual commands of the Tenth
allows for a harmonization of the texts. By reserving non-delegated powers “to
the states respectively or to the people,” the Tenth allows the people of each state
to decide whether their respective governments will exercise this non-delegated
power, or whether the people will reserve this power from both the federal and
their state governments. For example, the federal government has no power to
require music education in the public schools. Power to mandate the content of
public education is reserved to the states respectively or to the people. This
leaves the people of, say, Massachusetts free to require music education through
a majoritarian decision of their legislature, or deny such power to their state
government and reserve the right to the people as a matter of individual choice.
Once harmonized with the Tenth, retained rights under the Ninth Amendment
work in a similar, though non-redundant, manner.68 The retained rights of the
people involve those rights withheld from the federal government and under the
control of the people on a state by state basis. The people of a given state may,
however, assign control over these retained rights to their respective state
governments. This is one of the core sovereign rights of the people and, again by
definition, such an assignment would occur on a state by state basis.
In sum: The text of the Ninth Amendment does not affect the interpretation of
enumerated rights like the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (or
any other enumerated right). The text is solely concerned with constructions that
deny or disparage unenumerated rights. The term “rights” is unrestricted, and
there is nothing in the text of the Ninth to suggest that it refers to only a
subcategory of retained rights (whether individual or majoritarian). Because
67

The result becomes even more absurd when one considers the possibility of retained
collective rights, such as the right to regulate education on a local level. This kind of
collective right cannot logically be retained from state control.
68
For a discussion of the separate and distinct role of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments,
see infra note __ and accompanying text.
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“retaining” a right by definition means leaving that right to the majoritarian
control of the people in the states, all retained rights are “federalist” in their
operative effect in that they are retained to the majoritarian control of the people
in the several states.
II.

The Text and the Historical Record

1.

Contemporary References to the Retained Collective Rights of the People

The idea that retained rights were collective or federalist in nature is strongly
supported by the historical record as well as by the text of the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments. The testimony we have from the drafter of the Ninth (James
Madison), the members of Congress who voted to propose the Ninth, and the
members of the state assemblies who ratified the Ninth, are unanimous in
describing the Ninth as a guardian of the sovereign rights of the people in the
several states. Courts and commentators echoed this same understanding of the
meaning and operative effect of the Ninth Amendment for over one hundred
years.
To begin with, the historical record includes examples of the framers, ratifiers,
and early Supreme Court Justices describing the right of local self-government as
one of the retained rights of the people. According to Ninth Amendment
draftsman James Madison:
“In establishing [the federal] Government, the people retained
other governments capable of exercising such necessary and
useful powers as were not to be exercised by the General
Government.”69
Notice that Madison describes “the People” as having retained their local (state)
governments. In coming together to form a national “people,” the people of the
individual states retained their right to control matters “not to be exercised by the
general government.” This same idea is echoed by the state conventions that
ratified the Constitution. According to the declaration of the New York
Ratifying Convention:
The powers of government may be reassumed by the people,
whenever it shall become necessary to their happiness; that every
power jurisdiction and right, which is not by the said constitution
clearly delegated to the congress of the United States, or the
departments of the government thereof, remains to the people of
the several states, or to their respective state governments, to
whom they may have granted the same.70

69

James Madison to Spencer Roane (Sept. 2, 1819), reprinted in The Mind of the
Founder, supra note __ at 362 (emphasis added).
70
See Amendments Proposed by the New York Convention (July 26, 1788), in Creating
the Bill of Rights, supra note__, at 21–22; see also 1 Elliot’s Debates, supra note __ at
329.
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Once again, “the people” are described as retaining the autonomy of local
government. The collective people of New York, in this case, reserved the
authority to delegate any or all retained “power jurisdiction and rights” to their
respective state governments, if they wished to do so. Nor was this mere wishful
thinking on the part of anti-federalists who “lost” the debate over the proposed
Constitution. We have already seen how Madison shared the same view of the
retained right of the people to local government. Early Supreme Court decisions
confirmed this common readying of the retained collective rights of the people in
the states. Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase, whose 1797 opinion in Calder
v. Bull is regularly cited in support of a libertarian reading of the Ninth
Amendment, expressly declared that all retained rights are left to the local control
of state majorities. According to Chase:
“All power, jurisdiction, and rights of sovereignty, not granted
by the people by that instrument, or relinquished, are still
retained by them in their several states, and in their respective
state legislatures, according to their forms of government.”71
There were, of course, disputed conceptions of the people in decades following
the adoption of the Constitution.72 Indeed, the precise nature of the “the people”
remained a fiercely contested issue in the period between the Founding and the
Civil War (and after).73 For our purposes, however, one need not decide whether
“the people” refers to the undifferentiated people of the United States, or the
separate people(s) in the several states or, as Madison apparently believed, both.
As far as the Ninth and Tenth Amendments are concerned, the result is the same
whether one sees the people through a nationalist or federalist lens. All sides of
the debate agreed that, however conceived, “We the People” had the sovereign
right to divide power between the national and local governments.74 As Madison
71

Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase (1797) in Campbell v. Morris, 3 H. & McH 535
(Md. Gen. 1797). See also Douglass' Adm'r v. Stevens, 2 Del.Cas. 489 (Del. 1819). See
also Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798) (Chase, C.J.) (“It appears to me a self-evident
proposition, that the several State Legislatures retain all the powers of legislation,
delegated to them by the State Constitutions; which are not EXPRESSLY taken away by
the Constitution of the United States.”)(emphasis in original).
72
One of the most hotly contested issues in constitutional interpretation in the early
decades of the Constitution regarded whether the Constitution was a compact between the
people of the individual states, or a document establishing a single national sovereign
people. Early constitutional treatise writers such as St. George Tucker embraced the
former, while nationalists like Joseph Story and John Marshall embraced the latter. For a
general discussion of the competing positions, see Kurt T. Lash, “Tucker’s Rule”: St.
George Tucker and the Limited Construction of Federal Power 47 W. & M. L. Rev. 1343
(2006). All sides in this debate, however, believed that all non-delegated powers, JDX
and rights were left to the control of the people in the individual states.
73
Compare St. George Tucker, View of the Constitution (compact theory) with John
Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland. See generally G. Edward White, History
of the Supreme Court (discussing the debate between compact theorists and nationalists
like Story and Marshall).
74
Although some Anti-Federalists complained that the Tenth Amendment’s reference to
“the people” might be read as consolidating the nation into a single unitary mass,
Federalists denied the claim and moderates had no difficulty in reading the clause as
reserving non-delegated power to the people of the individual states. Compare Letter
from Richard Henry Lee to Patrick Henry (Sept. 14th, 1789), in Creating the Bill of
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put it, “the people retained other governments capable of exercising such
necessary and useful powers as were not to be exercised by the General
Government.”75 In this way, “the people” of both the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments could be viewed as referring to We the People of the United States
and the retained rights and powers of the people in the individual states. 76
2.

The Collective People of the Ninth Amendment

This federalist view of the people’s reserved rights was not limited to “the
people” of the Tenth Amendment. Framers, ratifiers and early Supreme Court
Justices shared a similar view of the people’s retained rights under the Ninth
Amendment. In his 1791 speech against the proposed Bank of the United States,
James Madison argued that federal power did not extend to chartering a Bank
and that stretching the enumerated powers of Congress to include such power
would violate the Ninth and Tenth Amendments. According to Madison, the
Ninth “guard[ed] against a latitude of interpretation” while the Tenth “exclud[ed]
every source of power not of exercising the within the Constitution itself.”77
Madison concluded that chartering a Bank violated the rights of the state to
charter Banks free from federal interference.78 Madison’s use of the Ninth is a
stark example of how the retained rights of the Ninth included state majoritarian
rights.
There is evidence that Madison’s colleagues in the House shared the same view
of the Ninth Amendment. John Page, a member of the House when Madison
Rights, supra note __ at 295, 296 (complaining about the language of the Tenth
Amendment), with Letter from Edmund Randolph to George Washington (Dec. 6, 1789),
in 5 Documentary History, supra note__, at 223 (“The twelfth [the Tenth] amendment
does not appear to me to have any real effect, unless it be to excite a dispute between the
United States, and every particular state, as to what is delegated. It accords pretty nearly
with what our convention proposed.”).
75
James Madison to Spencer Roane (Sept. 2, 1819), reprinted in The Mind of the
Founder, supra note __ at 362. See also Massachusetts Attorney-General James
Sullivan's Observations upon the Government of the United States 22 (1791)
(“Sovereignty must by its very nature be absolute and uncontrolable by any civil
authority, with respect to the objects to which it extends. A subordinate sovereignty is
nonsense.: A subordinate uncontrolable sovereignty is a contradiction in terms : But there
may be a political sovereignty, limited as to the objects of its extension: It may extend to
some things, but not to others, or be vested for some purposes , and not for others.”).
76
For additional Founding era examples of references to the “people” on a state level,
see, See Massachusetts Attorney-General James Sullivan's Observations upon the
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proposed the Bill of Rights, also described the Ninth as protecting both the rights
of individuals and the states. In his 1799 campaign pamphlet, John Page argued
that the Alien and Sedition Acts were “not only unnecessary, impolitic and
unjust, but unconstitutional.”79 According to Page, the Acts violated the retained
rights of the states as protected by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments (which he
refers to as the 11th and 12th articles).
The power therefore which Congress has claimed and exercised
in enacting the Alien Act, not having been granted by the people
in their constitution, but on the contrary having been claimed and
hitherto wisely and patriotically exercised by the state
legislatures, for the benefit of individual states, and for the safety
of the general government, must be among those powers, which
not having been granted to Congress, nor denied to the states, are
declared by the 11th and twelfth articles of the amendments to
the constitution to be reserved to the states respectively , and
therefore the alien act is an encroachment on those rights, and
must be unconstitutional. . . . Because it is an interference with,
and an encroachment on, the reserved rights of the individual
states (see the 11th and 12th articles of the amendments).80
Hardin Burnley, a member of the Virginia House of Delegates, supported
ratification of the Ninth Amendment on the grounds that the provision would
“protect[] the rights of the people & of the States.”81 John Overton, a member of
the second North Carolina Ratifying Convention that ratified the Ninth
Amendment, similarly viewed the Ninth as working alongside the Tenth to
preserve the retained state right of “self preservation.” Writing as a judge on the
Tennessee bench, Overton declared:
[N]ations as well as individuals are tenacious of the rights of
self-preservation, of which, as applied to sovereign States, the
right of soil or eminent domain is one. Constitutions, treaties, or
laws, in derogation of these rights are to be construed strictly.
Vattel is of this opinion, and, what is more satisfactory, the
Federalist, and the American author of the Notes to Blackstone's
Commentaries, two of the most eminent writers on
jurisprudence, are of the same opinion. [Here Judge Overton
cites, among other things, the Ninth and Tenth Amendments].
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St. George Tucker, Professor at the College of William and Mary from 17881804, wrote in his influential “View of the Constitution” that the Ninth
Amendment guarded the people’s collective right to alter or abolish their form of
government. According to Tucker, under the principles of the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments “the powers delegated to the federal government, are, in all cases,
to receive the most strict construction that the instrument will bear, where the
rights of a state or of the people, either collectively, or individually, may be
drawn in question.”82 Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story, in the first Supreme
Court opinion to discuss the Ninth Amendment, read the Ninth as preserving the
concurrent powers of state majorities.83
These are but a few examples of historical testimony by those immediately
involved with creating and ratifying the Ninth Amendment, as well as early
scholarly and judicial commentary. As I have presented elsewhere, the historical
record contains literally hundreds of additional references to the Ninth
Amendment as a provision reserving all retained rights, individual and
majoritarian, to the control of local majorities.84 The historical record thus
strongly supports our reading of the text.85 There is no evidence the term “rights”
was understood in a restrictive manner, and extensive uncontradicted evidence
that the term was understood to preserve local control of both individual and
majoritarian rights.
Summing Up the Semantic Meaning of the Text
The text of the Ninth Amendment forbids a particular construction that denies or
diminishes rights retained by the people on a state by state basis. Put another
way, the text forbids constructions that interfere with the retained right to local
self-government. Even those retained rights that are individual in terms of their
application against the federal government are collective in term of their being
retained under local majoritarian control.
Embedded in the text of the Ninth thus are two separate forbidden rules of
construction: First, the fact of enumeration must not be read to imply the
necessity of enumeration. Second, the fact of enumeration must not be read to
suggest the superiority of enumeration. Whatever the content of unenumerated
retained rights, the fact that they are not enumerated does not suggest a lower
status. Finally, nothing in the text of the Ninth forbids narrow interpretations of
enumerated rights. Such interpretations, even if in error, do not deny or
disparage other unenumerated retained rights.

82. Id. at 154.
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III. Intratextualism: The Text of the Ninth in the Context of the Constitution
The text of the Ninth Amendment does not stand alone, but must be integrated
into the overall text of the Constitution. Because the above analysis reads the
Ninth as preserving the prerogatives of state majorities, the question arises
whether this renders the Ninth redundant with the Tenth Amendment. Also, even
if the Ninth was originally understood as a guardian of local autonomy, later
amendments substantially altered the original federalist structure of the Ninth
Amendment. The Fourteenth Amendment in particular seems to remove whole
categories of rights from local control and place them under the protection of the
national government. It is possible that the Fourteenth Amendment radically
altered the scope and function of the Ninth Amendment, thus rendering its
original meaning irrelevant. The following section seeks to reconcile the Ninth
with the Tenth and Fourteenth Amendments in a manner that leaves all three with
independent meaning and application.
1.

The Ninth and Tenth Amendments

My analysis of the text and history of the Ninth Amendment might seem to
render the Ninth and Tenth Amendments redundant guardians of state rights.
Closely examined, however, the text of the two amendments reveal related
provisions imposing overlapping but distinct constraints on federal power. The
Tenth limits the federal government to only enumerated powers. The Ninth
limits the interpretation of enumerated powers. Both provisions are necessary if
federal power is to be effectively constrained.
In the ratification debates, Federalist advocates of the Constitution promised that
the federal government would have only certain enumerated powers, leaving all
non-delegated powers jurisdiction and rights to the individual sovereign states.
As Madison explained in the Federalist Papers, this left the great mass of
regulatory authority over everyday matters in the hands of state majorities.86
Federalists justified the lack of a Bill of Rights on the grounds that adding a list
of enumerated rights might imply that federal power had no limits beyond those
expressly enumerated in the Constitution.
The problem with this argument, as Anti-Federalists pointed out, was that the
proposed Constitution already had a list of enumerated rights in Article I §§ 9 &
10. Thus, there already existed the potential for implied (and otherwise)
unlimited federal power. In order to win a sufficient number of votes to ratify the
Constitution (and avoid a second convention), Madison agreed to propose a Bill
of Rights. There remained, however, the problem of how to do so without
implying an otherwise unlimited interpretation of federal power. An obvious
solution, and one proposed by most state ratifying conventions, was the addition
of a clause expressly declaring that Congress’s powers were limited to those
enumerated in the Constitution, with all other non-delegated non-prohibited
powers remaining with the states. Madison obligingly adopted such an approach
by proposing what became our Tenth Amendment.
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But by itself, the Tenth was inadequate if the goal was preventing the federal
government from extending itself into all areas except those expressly declared
off-limits in a Bill of Rights. The necessary and proper clause granted Congress
the power to exercise unenumerated powers when “necessary and proper” to
advancing an enumerated end. It was possible that Congress might attempt to
extend its enumerated powers by way of the necessary and proper clause to such
a degree as to, in effect, arrogate to itself all powers except those expressly
denied in the Bill of Rights. Should Congress do so, this would not violate the
Tenth Amendment, for it would be no more than an exercise of those means
necessary to advancing delegated powers. It would, however, have the effect of
completely obliterating the people’s retained right to local self-government
beyond those subjects expressly listed in the Bill.
Preventing this undue extension of implied powers requires a rule of construction
controlling the interpretation of enumerated federal power.
The Ninth
Amendment declares that there exist restrictions on federal power beyond those
expressly enumerated in the Constitution. Such a rule can have no other
application except in regard to the limited construction of enumerated federal
power.
In this way, the Ninth and Tenth Amendments accomplish the same goal of
limiting the scope of federal power, but do so in different ways. The Tenth limits
the government to enumerated ends, while the Ninth Amendment limits the scope
of Congress’ implied means to advance those enumerated ends. In particular, the
Ninth prohibits the federal government from claiming that the only limit to its
“necessary and proper powers” are those expressly enumerated in the
Constitution. The people have other rights that also constrain the scope of
enumerated federal power. Applied in tandem (as they invariably were87) the
Ninth and Tenth establish that all retained powers and rights are left under the
control of the people in the states who may then delegate the same to their state
governments, or expressly retain them under their state constitution. Not only
does this reading of the text reconcile the Ninth with its historical application, it
also has the happy effect of giving the same meaning to “the people” in both the
Ninth and Tenth Amendments.
2.

The Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments

The debate over the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment began with
its enactment and shows no sign over abating a century and a half later.88 It is
not necessary for our purposes to resolve this debate and specifically define the
scope of the Fourteenth Amendment.89 The text alone allows for some general
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conclusions about the relationship of the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments,
regardless of the ultimate determined scope of provisions like the Due Process
and Privileges or Immunities Clause.
a.

The Ninth and Incorporation Doctrine

After establishing the national and state citizenship of all persons born in the
United States, the next sentence of Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment
declares that “no state shall” abridge the privileges of immunities of United
States citizens or deny any person the right to due process or the equal protection
under law. This restriction on state power carves out a portion of rights
previously retained by state majorities and places them beyond the reach of the
political process. The current scholarly debate involves the content of these
rights; for example whether they include some or all of the first eight
amendments, or whether they (also) include certain unenumerated rights such as
the right to privacy or the common law right to pursue a trade.90 No scholar or
judge has ever suggested that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Ninth
Amendment. From the earliest incorporation cases to modern doctrine, the Court
has consistently limited the scope of incorporation doctrine to the first eight
amendments.91
The history surrounding then adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment supports
the long-standing position of the courts that neither the Ninth nor Tenth
Amendments are proper candidates for incorporation. Throughout the first half
of the nineteenth century, the Ninth and Tenth Amendments were viewed as
preserving the autonomy of the states. Despite the incentive to raise every
possible liberty claim in opposition to slavery, abolitionists never referred to the
Ninth Amendment in support of their cause. Instead, in the years leading up to
the Civil War, both the Ninth and Tenth Amendments were invoked on behalf of
slavery and the right of states to secede from the Union.92 It is no surprise then
that the man who drafted Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, John
Bingham, left both the Ninth and Tenth Amendments off of his list of individual
privileges or immunities protected against state action by the Fourteenth
Amendment.93 In sum, the testimony of courts and commentators is unanimous
on at least this issue: The Fourteenth Amendment does not incorporate the Ninth.
Adoption of the Establishment Clause: The Rise of the Non-Establishment Principle, 27
Ariz. St. L.J. 1085 (1995); Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Free Exercise
Clause: Religious Exemptions Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev.
1106 (1994).
90
See Kurt T. Lash, Two Movements of a Constitutional Symphony: Akhil Reed Amar’s
The Bill of Rights, 33 U. Rich. Law Review 485 (1999).
91
See Lash, The Lost Jurisprudence of the Ninth Amendment, supra note __ at 673. In
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incorporation. See id. at 675.
92
See id. at 639.
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John Yoo points out that state constitutions during the nineteenth century adopted
provisions echoing the language of the federal Ninth Amendment. See John Choon Yoo,
Our Declaratory Ninth Amendment, 42 Emory L. J. 967 (1993). Although I think this is
important evidence that the language of the Ninth could be viewed in support of
individual rights, these state constitutional provisions cannot trump the extensive express
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But if the retained rights of the Ninth are not part of the Fourteenth Amendment,
then they must be reconciled with the Fourteenth. All of the rights now protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment originally fell within the category of rights
retained from the federal government and left as an initial matter under
majoritarian state control. This includes everything from chartering a bank to
establishing a religion to providing due process for deprivation of life liberty and
property. What in 1791 had been left to the collective control of the people in the
states, after 1868 now became a matter of the individual rights of “United States
citizens” and “persons” (to use the language of the Fourteenth Amendment).
More, what was once under the Ninth a statement of powers denied to the federal
government, becomes under Section 5 of the Fourteenth a declaration of powers
delegated to the regulatory authority of the federal government. In this way, the
Fourteenth Amendment clearly altered the scope of the Ninth.
But not all of the rights originally retained under the Ninth were subsumed by the
Fourteenth. The collective majoritarian rights protected under the Ninth cannot
logically be applied against collective state majorities any more than the reserved
powers of the Tenth Amendment can be applied against the states. For example,
assuming local control of education was an original right retained by the people,
this right cannot sensibly be applied against state majorities. The same would be
true for all retained collective or majoritarian rights.
These remnant
unenumerated rights remain under the protection of the Ninth to the extent that
they have not been abrogated (or transformed) by the Fourteenth.
b.

Reconciling the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments

We know from our textual analysis of the Ninth Amendment that the fact of
enumeration does not imply the necessity or superiority of enumeration.94
Accordingly, the remnant unenumerated retained rights of the Ninth (post-1868)
are no less important than the enumerated rights of the Fourteenth. This seems to
follow logically from our analysis thus far. It leads, however, to a critical (and
perhaps startling) conclusion: The enumerated rights of the Fourteenth
Amendment must not be construed in a manner that denies or disparages the
remnant retained rights of the Ninth. Moving beyond the bare semantic meaning
of the Ninth, the text of the Ninth also seem to imply that the rights of the
Fourteenth should not be unduly extended in a manner that intrudes upon the
people’s retained right to local self-government. For example, Congress ought
not to unduly extend its powers under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment
in a manner that wrongly intrudes upon a matter meant to be left to state control
even after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The need to limit the scope of potentially clashing rights is not without precedent.
The Court limits the scope of the Establishment Clause in order to avoid
like the free exercise and establishment clauses which appear to have been embraced as
individual rights provisions by the Civil War, no such transformation appears to have
occurred with the Ninth Amendment. See Lash, The Lost Jurisprudence of the Ninth
Amendment, supra note __ at 643-52.
94
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Barnett, The Ninth Amendment, supra note __ at 235.
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impinging upon the right to free speech.95 Similarly, reconciling the Ninth and
Fourteenth Amendments requires limiting the reach of the Fourteenth in order to
avoid impinging upon the unenumerated retained rights of the Ninth (and vice
versa). For example, suppose that Congress decides that the states have failed to
adequately educate children in music and the arts. Believing that this denial
violates substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment,
Congress exercises their power under Section 5 of that amendment and passes a
law providing a private cause of action for any individual denied “adequate
opportunity” to receive training in music and the arts. Further assume (as the
Court would surely hold), that this kind of positive right to a state funded
education goes beyond scope of enumerated rights protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment.96 As such, the law infringes the retained right of local majorities to
decide educational policy free from federal interference.
The same would be true should Congress attempt to pass the same law as
necessary and proper to advancing their power to regulate interstate commerce.97
Congress is no more free to unduly extend their powers under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment than they are under Section 8 of Article I.98 This does
not mean the earlier Ninth Amendment trumps the later-in-time Fourteenth. It
does mean that the Ninth prevents, in Madison’s words, any “latitude of
interpretation” that impinges upon the retained rights of the people.
The above analysis should look familiar to those who followed the federalist
jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court. Cases like City of Boerne99 and United
States v. Morrison100 use a similar limited analysis of Congress; power under
section 5 in order to preserve the autonomy of the states. The Court grounded
this jurisprudence, however, in the Tenth Amendment, and not the Ninth.101
Elsewhere I have traced the rise of the Tenth Amendment as a rule of
construction and how it came to eclipse the Ninth as the prime textual expression
of limited federal power.102 In fact, the Ninth and Tenth were generally cited in
tandem throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as the twin
guardians of federalism.103 Both clauses, however, fell into judicial disfavor at
the time of the New Deal and by the time the Rehnquist Court began to
reinvigorate the principles of federalism, the Ninth Amendment had been
“rediscovered” by the Warren and Burger Courts and adopted as a declaration of
uneneumerated individual rights.104
This left the Tenth as the prime
constitutional reference to the principle of federalism. The text of the Tenth
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Amendment, of course, does not expressly declare a rule of strict construction.
The Supreme Court has acknowledged as much,105 and critics of the modern
federalism jurisprudence have been quick to point out the lack of textual
justification for decisions like Boerne and Morrison, as well as other federalism
decisions like Lopez106 and Printz.107 A textual theory of the Ninth Amendment,
however, supports the federalist approach of these decisions with the additional
benefit of historical support.
The idea of limiting the construction of rights enumerated against the states in
order preserve state autonomy might sound like a modern invention of the
Rehnquist Court. In fact, Chief Justice John Marshall himself advanced this very
theory of limited construction of rights running against the states. According to
Marshall in Dartmouth College:
[E]ven marriage is a contract, and its obligations are affected by
the laws respecting divorces. That the clause in the constitution
[the Impairment of Contract Clause], if construed in its greatest
latitude, would prohibit these laws. Taken in its broad, unlimited
sense, the clause would be an unprofitable and vexatious
interference with the internal concerns of a state, would
unnecessarily and unwisely embarrass its legislation, and render
immutable those civil institutions, which are established for
purposes of internal government, and which, to subserve those
purposes, ought to vary with varying circumstances. . . . The
general correctness of these observations cannot be controverted.
That the framers of the constitution did not intend to restrain the
states in the regulation of their civil institutions, adopted for
internal government, and that the instrument they have given us,
is not to be so construed, may be admitted.108
According to Marshall, rights enumerated in the Constitution against the states
should not be construed in a manner that unduly interferes with the internal
concerns of a state. This is a rule of construction that limits an enumerated right
in order to preserve the autonomy of the states. Marshall did not cite the Ninth
Amendment, but his approach tracks implied meaning of the text and its
historical application. Unless the Fourteenth Amendment repealed the Ninth
Amendment sub silencio, the nature of retained unenumerated rights remains the
same after 1868, even if the scope of those rights has been significantly reduced.
Indeed, the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment has no impact on the
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operative effect of any remnant retained unenumerated right. Because these
remnant unenumerated rights retain full value, the fact that some rights are
enumerated (such as those listed in the Fourteenth Amendment) does not
diminish in any way the equal importance of the people’s retained rights.
IV. The Ninth Amendment and Judicial Review
The judicial branch is constrained by the Ninth Amendment just as much as the
political branches. So, for example, courts must not construe the enumeration of
certain rights in the Constitution to imply otherwise unconstrained federal
power.109 In fact, it seems that only a studied avoidance of the Ninth Amendment
could excuse the Marshall Court’s declaration that congressional power
“acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitution,”110
for this too violates the express terms of the Ninth by suggesting that the fact of
enumeration implies the necessity of enumeration.111
Courts do not violate the Ninth Amendment, however, if they limit the scope of
substantive due process to textual rights such as those listed in the first eight
amendments to the Constitution.112 Although some Ninth Amendment theorists
believe such a limited reading of Due Process conflicts with the Ninth,113 such a
reading does not deny or disparage the existence of other unenumerated rights.
As discussed above, narrow construction of enumerated rights has no effect on
the other rights retained by the people. To the extent that the Due Process Clause
(or, better, the Privileges or Immunities Clause) protects unenumerated rights
against state action, the precise content of such rights must be identified through
an act of interpretation focused on that particular clause and not on the basis of
the Ninth Amendment.
More, the text of the Ninth Amendment seems to prohibit an unenumerated rights
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The people’s retained rights
include collective majoritarian rights which, by definition, cannot be applied
against the states. Even in regard to retained unenumerated individual rights, the
text leaves these under the control of the people in the several states absent an
express mandate in the Constitution itself. As John Marshall explained in Barron
v. Baltimore, the framers of the Constitution employed express language when
they meant to bind the states. This rule of construction was not abandoned with
109
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the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment—indeed, the drafters of the
Fourteenth expressly followed the rule of Barron.114 To the degree that the
Reconstruction Amendments require the states to protect certain fundamental
rights, this must be the result of a textual interpretation of express provisions like
the Due Process or Privileges or Immunities Clause. If privacy and other
individual autonomy rights are to be applied against the states, it must be on the
merits of the Fourteenth Amendment itself, and not an implied absorption of the
retained unenumerated rights of the Ninth.
1.

Towards a Theory of Judicial Enforcement

The above analysis establishes that the Ninth Amendment limits the undue
extension of enumerated federal powers and rights against state majorities.
Undue extension of either threatens rights meant to be retained by the people.
This is not complicated as a matter of theory. However, even if we have
correctly identified the original meaning of the Ninth, we are left having to
construct a doctrine that effectuates the meaning of the text.
One could argue, of course, that judicial enforcement of the Ninth Amendment is
inappropriate. Perhaps the protection of local self-government should be left to
the political branches under the assumption that the structure of the Constitution
adequately protects the states from federal overreaching. As the Supreme Court
noted in Garcia, states can utilize their representative status in the House and
Senate (as well as the Electoral College) and effectively counter undue expansion
of federal authority to the detriment of the states.115 The difficulty with this
theory, however, is that it leaves enforcement of the people’s right to selfgovernment to state governments who may have an incentive to bargain away
their autonomy in exchange for federal benefits. As the text of the Ninth reminds
us, however, the retained rights guarded by the Ninth are the retained rights of
the people. Only the people in their sovereign capacity may waive or alter the
federalist division of power between national and local governments.
The man most responsible for the Ninth Amendment, James Madison, was
adamant about the need for judicial enforcement of the line between federal and
state authority. According to Madison, “the permanent success of the
Constitution depend[ed] on a definite partition of powers between the general
and state governments.”116 It was “of great importance as well as of
indispensable obligation, that the constitutional boundary between them should
be impartially maintained.”117 Madison objected to the Marshall Court’s broad
reading of federal power because it “seem[ed] to break down the landmarks
intended by the a specification of powers of Congress, and to substitute for a
definite connection between means and ends, a Legislative discretion as to the
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former to which no practical limit can be assigned.”118 By making “expediency
& constitutionality” convertible terms, the Supreme Court had relinquished “all
controul on the legislative exercise of unconstitutional powers” and placed the
federalist limits of federal power “beyond the reach of judicial cognizance.”119
To Madison at least, judicial enforcement of the people’s retained rights was
“indispensable.”
In fact, if limited to its semantic meaning, judicial enforcement of the Ninth is
fairly straightforward. Courts must not construe the fact of enumeration in a
manner that denies or disparages retained rights. The only time the semantic
meaning comes into play is when a court or government official insists that the
fact of enumeration suggests the necessity or superiority of enumeration. The
underlying principle of the Ninth, however, implies the existence of retained
rights beyond those expressly enumerated in the Constitution. Federal authority
was not meant to extend to all areas of life except those expressly placed off
limits. Put another way, the text of the Ninth Amendment suggests a pre-existing
limitation on federal power—a limitation enforceable by courts in situations
beyond those triggered by the primary semantic meaning of the Ninth
Amendment.
Exactly how the courts should effectuate the secondary implied principles of the
Ninth Amendment is a matter of constitutional construction, as opposed to a
particular doctrine mandated by the text of the Ninth Amendment.120 As usual,
James Madison provides us an early sketch of such a constructed theory of
judicial enforcement of the people’s retained unenumerated rights. In his 1791
speech against the Bank of the United States, Madison laid out the following
principles of interpretation:
[1] An interpretation that destroys the very characteristic of the
government cannot be just. . . .
[2] In controverted cases, the meaning of the parties to the
instrument, if to be collected by reasonable evidence, is a proper
guide.
[3] Contemporary and concurrent expositions are a reasonable
evidence of the meaning of the parties.
[4] In admitting or rejecting a constructive authority, not only the
degree of its incidentality to an express authority, is to be
regarded, but the degree of its importance also; since on this will
depend the probability or improbability of its being left to
construction.121
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The “very characteristic of the government” Madison insisted on protected
involved limited enumerated federal power as envisioned by the ratifying
conventions and declared in the statements they submitted when they ratified the
Constitution. This characteristic would be destroyed if Congress could extend
their implied powers to include “great and important powers” never meant to be
“left to construction.” The rule of limited construction of federal power was
implicit in the Constitution itself, but expressly declared by the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments, “the former, as guarding against a latitude of interpretation—the
latter, as excluding every source of power not within the constitution itself.122 In
this particular case, Madison argued that the power to charter a Bank or any other
corporation was a great and important power that required express enumeration.
The attempt to stretch the enumerated powers of the federal government to
include such a charter altered the essential nature of limited government and,
therefore, violated the retained rights of the states under the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments.
Madison’s opponents on the Bank Bill objected that Madison had taken a mere
policy debate and turned it into a matter of “rights.”123 In fact, Madison treated
the federalist division of power as a right reserved to the people in the states, and
his approach to guarding that right is quite similar to the modern courts
application of strict scrutiny. Responding to Spencer Roane’s criticism of the
Court’s interpretation of federal power and jurisdiction in Cohens v. Virginia,
Madison wrote that when it came to the exercise of federal power, “the means of
execution should be of the most obvious and essential kind; & exerted in the
ways as little intrusive as possible on the powers and police of the states.”124
Thus, laws affecting the states must be “obvious and essential” (compelling) and
executed in the least restrictive manner possible (“as little intrusive as possible”).
This approach also echoes the modern Court’s interpretation of federal power in
cases like Lopez, which require an actual nexus with interstate commerce,125 and
the “proportional and congruent” test of Congress’ Section 5 powers articulated
in Boerne.126 Again, it has been common to view these decisions as application
of the “spirit” of the Tenth Amendment. The same jurisprudence, however,
could be applied under the Ninth Amendment with greater textual and historical
justification.
In addition to preserving certain subject to local control, the Ninth Amendment
also counsels against construing federal power as exclusive of concurrent state
authority, unless absolutely necessary. Some of the earliest applications of the
Ninth Amendment involved the question of concurrent v. exclusive federal
power. Those favoring a presumption in favor of current state authority cited the
Ninth Amendment in support of a limited reading of exclusive federal power. In
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Houston v. Moore, the first Supreme Court opinion to discuss the Ninth
Amendment, Justice Joseph Story agreed:
The constitution containing a grant of powers in many instances
similar to those already existing in the state governments, and
some of these being of vital importance also to state authority
and state legislation, it is not to be admitted that a mere grant of
such powers in affirmative terms to Congress, does, per se,
transfer an exclusive sovereignty on such subjects to the latter.
On the contrary, a reasonable interpretation of that instrument
necessarily leads to the conclusion that the powers so granted are
never exclusive of similar powers existing in the states, unless
where the constitution has expressly, in terms, given an
exclusive power to Congress, or the exercise of a like power is
prohibited to the states, or there is a direct repugnancy or
incompatibility in the exercise of it by the states. . . . In all other
cases not falling within the classes already mentioned, it seems
unquestionable that the states retain concurrent authority with
Congress, not only upon the letter and spirit of the [ninth]
amendment of the constitution,127 but upon the soundest
principles of general reasoning.128
At issue in Houston was whether the states had concurrent authority along with
the federal government to discipline the militia once called into active duty. One
of Houston’s arguments was that the sole power of the states to regulate on
matters involving the militia was contained in the “reservation” clause of Article
I, Section 8, Clause 16.129 That clause, after granting Congress power to organize
and discipline the militia, reserved to the states “the Appointment of the officers,
and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by
Congress.”130 Houston argued that this reservation implied that all power not
expressly reserved to the states was exclusively in the hands of Congress.131
Story rejected this argument, applying the rule of construction he believed
declared by the Ninth Amendment:
It is almost too plain for argument, that the power here given to
Congress over the militia, is of a limited nature, and confined to
the objects specified in these clauses; and that in all other
respects, and for all other purposes, the militia are subject to the
control and government of the State authorities. Nor can the
reservation to the States of the appointment of the officers and
127
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authority of the training the militia according to the discipline
prescribed by Congress, be justly considered as weakening this
conclusion. That reservation constitutes an exception merely
from the power given to Congress ‘to provide for organizing,
arming, and disciplining the militia;’ and is a limitation upon the
authority, which would otherwise have developed upon it as to
the appointment of officers. But the exception from a given
power cannot, upon any fair reasoning, be considered as an
enumeration of all the powers which belong to the States over
the militia.[132] What those powers are must depend upon their
own constitutions; and what is not taken away by the
Constitution of the United States, must be considered as retained
by the States or the people. The exception then ascertains only
that Congress have not, and that the States have, the power to
appoint the officers of the militia, and to train them according to
the discipline prescribed by Congress. Nor does it seem
necessary to contend, that the power ‘to provide for organizing,
arming, and disciplining the militia,’ is exclusively vested in
Congress. It is merely an affirmative power, and if not in its own
nature incompatible with the existence of a like power in the
States, it may well leave a concurrent power in the latter.133
Notice that Story’s opinion (which remained influential for decades), provides a
literal application of the Ninth Amendment in a case dealing solely with the
majoritarian right to local self-government. The fact that the states are granted
some rights in terms of regulating the militia shall not be construed to deny or
disparage other unenumerated regulatory rights over the militia retained by the
states or the people. Reading federal power to be exclusive in this case was both
unnecessary and contrary to the letter and spirit of the Ninth Amendment.
2.

Summary

Early discussion and application of the Ninth Amendment present at least three
separate rules of application. First, and most obviously, the fact that some rights
are enumerated must not be construed to suggest a lack of other unenumerated
rights retained to the states or to the people. Secondly, the greater and more
important a power the more likely its absence from the enumerated powers of
Congress reflects a determination to leave the matter under the control of local
governments. Thirdly, in determining the boundary between national and local
authority, federal power should be construed to extend only to those means
“obvious and necessary” to advancing an enumerated end. Not only are courts
authorized to patrol this boundary, they are duty-bound to maintain the line
separating state and federal authority and guard local autonomy as one of the
retained rights of the people.

132. At this point in the online Westlaw transcription of the case there is an error: “What
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The first rule is a straightforward application of the text. Obscured by the modern
emphasis on individual rights, the text points beyond libertarian political theory
and protects all unenumerated rights, including the majoritarian right to local
self-government. The Ninth Amendment thus grounds federalism in the text of
the Constitution and establishes it as a constitutional right. Because such rights
cannot be denied or disparaged on account of their unenumerated status, this
places majoritarian rights on equal ground with enumerated individual rights.
Both are to receive equally vigorous judicial protection. Although generally
associated today with the Tenth Amendment, it is the text of the Ninth that calls
for a limited construction of enumerated federal power in order to avoid
disparaging the right of the people to keep certain matters under local control.
The second rule suggests there are some powers which, even if plausibly
“necessary and proper” to the advancement of an enumerated end, nevertheless
are of such and important or critical nature as to require specific enumeration.
This rule falls within the scope of the Ninth Amendment because it involves
limiting the construction of enumerated federal power in order to avoid denying a
right meant to be retained by the people.134 In essence, it establishes a method
for identifying a retained right. Once again, we can find analogies in the modern
jurisprudence of the Tenth Amendment. Cases like New York v. United States,135
and Printz v. United States136 involved whether Congress could exercise their
necessary and proper powers in a manner that commandeered state legislators or
state officials. According to the Court in Printz, “[a]lthough the States
surrendered many of their powers to the new Federal Government, they retained
"a residuary and inviolable sovereignty."137 Allowing federal control of state
authorities would critically undermine the federalist separation of powers, for
“[i]t is an essential attribute of the States' retained sovereignty that they remain
independent and autonomous within their proper sphere of authority.”138 Nor
was there any historical evidence suggesting “that the Federal Government may
command the States' executive power in the absence of a particularized
constitutional authorization.”139 The power to “commandeer” state governments
in the service of federal policy was of such a significant nature that it required
specific enumeration, even if Congress could establish this means as necessary
and proper to an enumerated end.140
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Finally, as a constitutional right, legislative encroachment on the autonomy of
local majorities must be justified as meeting an obvious and essential enumerated
federal responsibility. It was essential to Madison that the scope of Congress’s
implied powers not be left to the discretion of the political branches, but
judicially determined and enforced. In reviewing the scope of federal power,
courts were to ensure that “the means of execution should be of the most obvious
and essential kind; & exerted in the ways as little intrusive as possible on the
powers and police of the states.” Madison’s rule implies the need to establish a
sufficient nexus between the chosen means and the enumerated end. Or, as the
Supreme Court has suggested, Congress may not “pile inference upon inference
in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional authority under the
Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the States.”
The Supreme Court’s late Nineteenth century commerce clause jurisprudence has
been criticized as drawing artificial distinctions between matters that “directly or
indirectly” affected interstate commerce. Similar criticism has been leveled at
the current Court’s distinction between commercial and non-commercial local
activity. Artificial or not, such distinctions can be viewed as attempts to require a
sufficient nexus between implied and enumerated power. The issue is not simply
whether the asserted power arguably implicates a federal responsibility, but
whether allowing such an extension effectively erases the distinction between
matters local and matters national—a distinction mandated by both the Ninth and
Tenth Amendments.
In addition to requiring a sufficient degree of nexus, the third rule requires that
federal power be “exerted in the ways as little intrusive as possible on the powers
and police of the states.” For example, even if Congress has authority under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to protect free exercise of religion
against certain state actions, the scope of justified congressional action depends
upon the degree of state interference with an enumerated right. Or, as the Court
has put it, congressional action must be “congruent and proportional” in light of
the identified problem.141
The Ninth Amendment demands that the
unenumerated rights of the people have equal status with enumerated rights.
Thus, a line must be drawn between retained majoritarian rights and enumerated
individual rights in manner that gives both equal regard and respect. The same
rule applies, of course, to all exercises of congressional power.
Strict scrutiny is generally reserved to government actions that impinge upon
protected rights. The text of the Ninth Amendment reminds us that maintaining
an area of retained local autonomy is itself a right of the people. As early
constitutional treatise writer St. George Tucker explained, under the Ninth and
Tenth Amendments, “the powers delegated to the federal government, are, in all
cases, to receive the most strict construction that the instrument will bear, where
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the rights of a state or of the people, either collectively or individually, may be
drawn in question.”142
Conclusion: A Modest Proposal
The case law I have drawn upon is generally associated with the Tenth
Amendment-based federalism jurisprudence of the current Supreme Court. In
many ways, the textual theory I have presented in this paper, both primarysemantic and secondary-implied, amounts to the modest proposal that this
jurisprudence be grounded in the Ninth, and not the Tenth Amendment. Doing
so would have the benefit of placing that jurisprudence on firmer textual and
historical ground. There are various normative justifications for doing so. To the
extent that one’s constitutional theory is based on the concept of popular
sovereignty, both the text and historical record suggest that the people insisted on
preserving areas of community life beyond the reach of the federal government.
The normative case for federalism, of course, has been and will continue to be
subject to intense debate. Once associated with intransigent state resistance to
desegregation, the notion of states’ rights today has a more progressive ring.
Recent claims of the right to local self-government involve not entrenched
racism, but the right to implement affirmative action programs. Issues such as
medicinal use of marijuana and physician assisted suicide also raise issues of
local self-government. Thus, even apart from popular sovereignty theory,
modern theories of justice and personal autonomy may find utility in a federalist
system of divided power.
In the end, however much power has been delegated into the hands of the federal
government, the text of the Ninth Amendment reminds us that we retain
innumerable liberties, both individual and majoritarian. Drawing the line
between rights assigned and rights retained requires drawing a line between
federal and local control. This separation of power is one of the fundamental
rights of the people.
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